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INTRODUCTION
For the past twelve months, there has been a burgeoning campaign
to abolish, or greatly reduce, the use of segregated confinement in pris-
ons.1 Advocates for the campaign call such classifications "solitary confine-
ment" despite the fact that in some states, like New York, prisoners in
these cells are often double-celled. 2 The Michigan Department of Correc-
tions, as well as other prison systems, uses labels such as "segregation,"
"special management," "special housing," and "observation" for these
classifications.3 Prisoners ordinarily use traditional terms, such as "the
* Elizabeth Alexander and Patricia Streeter serve as co-counsel in Hadix v. Caruso. See
infra text at note 5. Ms. Alexander is in practice in Washington, D.C., and Ms. Streeter is in
practice in Ann Arbor, Michigan
1. For a compilation of materials related to the campaign, see SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS
FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN, http://solitarywatch.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
2. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE COST OF EXTREME ISOLA-
TION IN NEW YORK PRISONS 34, available at www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu-boxin-
FINAL.pdf.
3. "Solitary confinement" is a general term. In Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214
(2005), the Supreme Court described confinement at the Ohio State Prison that involved pris-
oners spending twenty-three hours a day in cells with solid metal doors, taking their meals in
their cells, exercising alone, and lacking the ability to control cell lighting as more restrictive than
other forms of solitary confinement in Ohio.
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hole."4 In this Essay we will refer to such restrictive classifications as "seg-
regation" or "segregated confinement." Our perspective on the problems
with such classifications comes from serving as counsel for plaintiffs in
Hadix v. Caruso. Hadix is a long-running class action regarding what was
once called the State Prison of Southern Michigan; in this case, we are
attempting to enforce remaining portions of a 1984 consent decree to
which the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) is subject.5
Part of what we describe in this Essay is the harm that segregated
confinement has inflicted on mentally ill members of the Hadix class. The
evidence of harm to mentally ill prisoners from segregated confinement
that we found was entirely predictable. It has long been known that segre-
gated confinement results in the deterioration of the mental health status
of many prisoners so confined and the related deterioration of their ability
to interact safely with other persons once released from segregation. 6 This
Essay, however, will not focus particularly on the harms caused by the
propensity of segregated confinement to engender or exacerbate mental
illness.
We will describe examples drawn from our own experiences and
other litigation in Michigan documenting the potential for lethality from
assigning medically vulnerable prisoners to segregated confinement-an
issue that has received less attention in the national campaign against the
use of solitary confinement. We will also suggest explanations for why as-
signing such prisoners to segregated confinement is so predictably danger-
ous, as well as why the MDOC has been so slow to recognize these
dangers.
We will argue that many of the harms flowing from segregation in
Michigan arise from the fact that such confinement, to a much greater
extent than confinement in the prison general population, renders prison-
ers with disabilities and other medical needs at special risk from such con-
finement. The physical barriers imposed by segregated confinement make
it far more difficult for prisoners to communicate emergency needs to staff,
and far more difficult for staff to recognize those needs. In addition, segre-
gated confinement promotes a culture in which staff become particularly
inattentive to information suggesting that a prisoner is at serious risk.
These particular features of segregation in Michigan (as well as other states)
4. This observation is based on our experience representing prisoners in a variety of
facilities.
5. See, e.g., 465 F. Supp. 2d 776, 778-89 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (discussing the litigation
history of case), vacated, 248 F. App'x 678 (6th Cir. 2007).
6. See, e.g., Reassessing Solitary Confinement-The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety
Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm., 112th Cong. 419 (2012) (statement of
Terry Kupers, M.D.); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'y 325, 333-53 (2006); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and
"Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 130-132 (2003).
[VOL. 18:251252
Isolated Confinement in Michigan
have had deadly consequences, yet the MDOC has repeatedly failed to
adjust policy and practice in light of the demonstrated risks to prisoners.
The standard features of segregation cells in Michigan, as well as else-
where, include doors that are solid rather than barred, with small or non-
existent windows in the door. This serves to isolate the prisoner and
interfere with the prisoner's ability to communicate with staff, as well as
the ability of staff to observe the behavior and physical condition of the
prisoner.7 This danger arises precisely from the intended architectural
function of segregation cells to isolate the occupants from communication
with others.
Moreover, the personal characteristics of prisoners placed in segrega-
tion tend to exacerbate the risks from such confinement. While much of
the literature regarding segregated confinement has focused on the risk
that rules violations triggered by mental illness will result in isolation rather
than treatment, segregation in Michigan is not restricted to rules violators.
The risks from segregated confinement are substantially exacerbated be-
cause the MDOC does not restrict its use to the punishment of misbe-
having prisoners. In fact, the MDOC has also assigned prisoners to
segregation because of their mental or physical illnesses. As discussed below,
these uses of segregation result in precisely those prisoners at most risk for
experiencing emergency medical and mental health needs having the least
access to treatment in the event of a life-threatening emergency." Some of
the prisoners placed in segregated confinement because of their medical
and mental health problems have been subjected to conditions that entailed
physical and mental suffering that, had it been ordered as punishment,
would have clearly been classified as torture.9 Moreover, the MDOC's use
of segregation to confine persons with severe medical problems and physi-
cal disabilities exposes them to an unreasonably high risk of harm, regard-
less of whether the prisoners deserve punishment for the violation of
prison rules.
I. THE LETHAL HISTORY OF MICHIGAN SEGREGATION CELLS
MDOC policy allows prisoners to be assigned to segregation because
they are considered suicidal or otherwise mentally unstable.' 0 Indeed, the
MDOC has a particularly tragic history of deaths related to assigning men-
7. This description of typical segregation cell features is based on our personal observa-
tions at various Michigan prisons and is similar to segregation cells in other prisons that we have
observed. See also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214 (describing cell conditions in Ohio's supermax,
Ohio State Penitentiary).
8. As many of the cases we discuss below illustrate, prisoners who die while confined in
segregation frequently suffer from serious medical conditions, including serious mental disorders.
9. See Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 595-96 (W.D. Mich. 2006) [hereinafter
Hadix 1] (barring the use of in-cell mechanical restraints for punitive purposes).
10. See MICH. DEP'T OF COIutn., POLICY 04.06.115-SUICIDE PREVENTION, 11 N-O
(1999).
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tally ill prisoners to segregated housing. We found several such cases simply
by looking at reported opinions from the federal courts. For example, a
Sixth Circuit opinion describes the death of Ozy Vaughn, a mentally dis-
abled prisoner, after he became dehydrated in an observation room in the
Riverside Correctional Facility in lonia, Michigan. The temperature in
that room exceeded ninety degrees in January 2002.11 It is unclear why the
observation room was so hot.12 Prison officials placed Mr. Vaughn in the
observation room after he engaged in bizarre behavior, such as standing
naked over his cellmate while preaching, as well as stating that outside
forces were controlling his actions.' 3 Following that placement, a staff psy-
chiatrist prescribed a psychotropic medication for Mr. Vaughn that inter-
feres with the brain's ability to regulate body temperature.' 4 After Mr.
Vaughn spent a weekend in the observation room, the staff psychiatrist
noted that his condition was worsening. Nonetheless, the psychiatrist,
who was aware of the excessive heat, decided to give the medication more
time to work.' 5 Days later, Mr. Vaughn was vomiting after attempting to
drink a large amount of water.' 6 The temperature in the room had reached
ninety-six degrees.' 7 As Mr. Vaughn's condition continued to deteriorate
that day, the psychiatrist decided to continue his observation, with a plan
to move Mr. Vaughn to a cooler room and eventually to a psychiatric
hospital.' 8 However, Mr. Vaughn, still in the observation room, continued
to vomit and dry heave.' 9 He died from dehydration early the next
morning. 20
The court does not discuss the physical characteristics of the room;
however, it appears that the room had a solid door rather than a standard-
cell grill opening because the opinion refers to the plaintiff having been
moved from a prison cell to the room. 2 1 "Rooms" in prison generally refer
to housing with solid rather than grill doors. 22 In addition, the court de-
scribes the temperature problems only in relation to problems within the
cell, suggesting that a solid door (probably with a viewing window) was
11. See Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657, 660-61 (6th Cir. 2008). The degree of risk
was probably heightened by high humidity. See discussion of Timothy Souders and heat indices,
infra note 87.
12. Gibson, 523 F. 3d at 660.
13. Id. at 661-62.
14. Id. at 661-63.
15. Id. at 661.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 660.
22. This observation is based on the authors' experiences.
254 [VOL. 18:251
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involved.2 3 Thus, it is likely that the observation cell met our definition of
a segregation cell. 24
Also in 2002, Jeffrey Clark was a prisoner at the Bellamy Creek Cor-
rectional Facility while the prison was in the grip of high temperatures. 25
On June 29, 2002, Mr. Clark collapsed while he was outside on the prison
yard.26 Staff noticed that, after the collapse, Mr. Clark was crying, talking
about dying, and not making sense. 27 A correctional officer believed that
Mr. Clark was suffering from mental problems and transported him to an
observation cell.28 Although the observation cell was purportedly used so
that behavior could be monitored more closely, the cell had a solid door
with a small window and a food slot. 29 Functionally, it was a segregation
cell. 3 0 Correctional staff described Mr. Clark as "barking like a dog" and
screaming after being placed in the cell.3 '
When officers attempted to move Mr. Clark back to a regular cell,
his legs went limp, and he stiffened up.32 This behavior led staff to decide
to leave him in the observation cell.33 By June 30, Mr. Clark's water had
been turned off.34 The next day, a staff psychologist diagnosed Mr. Clark
as suffering from psychosis.3 5 The psychologist asked that Mr. Clark's
water be turned back on, but the correctional officer in charge denied that
request.3 6 Later that day, Mr. Clark was observed drinking from the toi-
let.3 7 The next day, July 2, the water in Mr. Clark's cell was off again, and
the head of outpatient mental health services at the prison stated that Mr.
Clark was psychotic and in need of intensive services.3 8 On July 3, mental
health staff observed that Mr. Clark was "virtually non-responsive," al-
though several prisoners described him as asking for water.3 9 The officer in
charge informed the Resident Unit Manager of the housing unit that Mr.
23. See Gibson, 523 F.3d at 661.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
25. See Clark-Murphy v. Forebeck, 439 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
events that led to Mr. Clark's death occurred during a heat alert period at the prison, meaning
that the temperature outside was at least eighty-five degrees).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying note 3.
31. See Clark-Murphy, 439 F.3d at 283.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 284.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 285.
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Clark's water was turned off. 40 The Resident Unit Manager responded
that the water could not be left off.4 ' The following day, July 4th, 2002,
Mr. Clark was discovered in rigor mortis in his "observation" cell. 4 2 When
staff entered Mr. Clark's cell that day, it was the first time the cell door had
been opened since the attempted move to regular housing on June 29th.4 3
In January 2005, Anthony McManus was at the Baraga Correctional
Facility, a maximum security facility where most, if not all, prisoners are
held in cells that are essentially the equivalent of segregation. 4 4 According
to evidence submitted by the estate of the deceased prisoner, Mr. Mc-
Manus suffered from several psychological problems that the prison staff
failed to treat.4 5 The facility lacked a psychiatric department, and a nurse
on staff testified that prisoners with psychiatric illnesses should not be kept
in the facility. 46 In late January 2005, Mr. McManus was placed on a fin-
ger-food diet. 4 7 By July 2005, Mr. McManus, whose height was 5'7", was
reported to weigh ninety pounds.48 A staff member reported that Mr. Mc-
Manus looked like someone from a concentration camp.49 "[D]uring the
final weeks of Mr. McManus's life, various [stafiJ turned off the water in
his cell and restricted his access to food" in an attempt to control his be-
havior. 0 Mr. McManus often refused to eat, and he often smeared the
food he received on the walls of the cell.5 ' On September 5, 2005, Mr.
McManus flooded his cell, and a staff nurse determined that there were no
health reasons why a chemical agent could not be used in order to remove
Mr. McManus from his cell. 52 Mr. McManus was then moved, naked, to
another housing unit.5 3 The nurse, who observed the move, saw that Mr.
McManus was breathing but did not perform a hands-on medical exami-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 283.
44. See Baraga Correctional Facility, MICH. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS,
www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-5325-00.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (stating
that seven of the prison's eight housing units house maximum security prisoners within the
secure perimeter). The doors of the cells in which Mr. McManus was held had narrow windows
and food slots and staff found it difficult to observe Mr. McManus in the cells due to a combina-
tion of the cell door design and his behavior. See Valarie v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No.
2:07-cv-5, 2009 WL 2232684, at *4-*5 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 2009).
45. See Valarie, 2009 WL 2232684, at *1.
46. See id. at *1.
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id.
49. See id. at *2. Presumably the finger food diet was ordered in response to Mr. Mc-
Manus' habit of smearing food on the walls of his cell. See id. at *3.
50. Id. at *3.
51. See id.
52. Id. at *4.
53. Id.
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nation. 54 The nurse did note that his speech was nonsensical.5 5 A video-
tape of the move shows a "very emaciated, naked individual" who is
speaking incoherently but "eventually makes clear requests for water and
help."5 6 Two days later, a correctional officer suggested that Mr. McManus
should be examined by medical staff.5 7 The next morning, staff noticed
that Mr. McManus was not breathing.58
A report on Mr. Manus's death by the Chief of Clinical Affairs of the
Corrections Mental Health Program notes the following:
[U]ntreated mental illness probably explains the weight loss
that made McManus vulnerable to changes in hydration. Ab-
sent behavior arising from mental illness, it is likely that water
restriction would not have been imposed. Failure by staff to
appreciate the significance of extreme weight loss, whether at-
tributed to mental illness or not, and imposition of water re-
striction in a nutritionally compromised prisoner without
adequate monitoring appear to be the most immediate contrib-
utors to death.59
1I. MENTALLY ILL HADIX CLASS MEMBERS HAVE SUFFERED SEVERE
HARM FROM CONFINEMENT IN SEGREGATION
Sadly, all three of these deaths bear substantial similarities to the later
death of Timothy Souders, a member of the Hadix class. We had long been
concerned that class members with certain health characteristics could be
at high risk of heat injury in the conditions prevailing in the Hadix cellb-
locks during hot, humid weather. In 2000 and 2002, we sought orders that
such prisoners, including prisoners prescribed psychotropic medications
that interfered with their ability to regulate body temperature, be assigned
to temperature-controlled housing.60 In the course of preparing for the
2002 evidentiary hearing on that and other issues, we developed evidence
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *5.
58. See id.
59. Id. at *6. The Michigan Department of Community Mental Health provides mental
health services to prisoners with serious mental illness through a contract with the Department
of Corrections. Prisoner Mental Health Serices, MICH. DEP'T Or COsR., http://www.michigan.
gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-9741_9744--,00.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
60. Following a 1999 hearing, the court made a finding that defendants' heat alert policies
had failed to avert an imminent risk of harm violating the Constitution and that a remedial order
was required to address this failing. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 51, 57, 58, Hadix
v. Johnson, No. 4:92-CV-1 10 (W.D. Mich. 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Findings]. In a subsequent
hearing, the court found that the constitutional violation had continued. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 236, Hadix v. Johnson, No. 4:92-CV-1 10 (W.D. Mich. 2002) [hereinaf-
ter 2002 Findings].
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regarding a sixty-seven-year-old man who had suffered a fatal heart attack.
This Hadix class member had been excused from work for several days
because of the heat.6 I He was then required to return to work.6 2 He col-
lapsed and died after being forced to walk a quarter mile in direct sun on a
day in which the National Weather Service reported that the heat index
was 107 degrees.6 3 After various proceedings, the district court issued an
interim order requiring the defendants to implement their own plan that
did not require the Department of Corrections to place high risk prisoners
in temperature-controlled housing.64
The district court then scheduled a hearing to consider the MDOC
request to terminate injunctive relief regarding medical care, and the plain-
tiffs' request for additional relief on various issues, including protection
from heat injury. While the parties were preparing for the hearing,
Timothy Souders arrived at the Hadix facilities in March 2006.65 Prior to
Mr. Souders' incarceration, he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and depression; he also had a history of suicide attempts. 66 Although he
was a young man, he also was prescribed medication for a thyroid disorder
and had risk factors for cardiovascular disease.6 7 Because of Mr. Souders'
medical and mental health problems, it was known that he would be sub-
ject to a high risk of injury from exposure to excessive heat. 68 About two
months after Mr. Souders arrived at the Southern Michigan Correctional
Facility, the only psychiatrist for the approximately 1,400 prisoners there
went on leave. 69
The following month (June 2006), Mr. Souders received a discipli-
nary charge for fighting with another prisoner. 70 As a result, he was or-
dered to undergo thirty days of punitive detention in "Top 6," a notorious
segregation unit within the prison.7 Top 6 had previously been the site of
61. 2002 Findings supra note 60, at 228-29.
62. Id. at 229.
63. See id. at 229-30. Heat indices are important in determining the healthfulness of a
particular temperature, combining temperature, ventilation and humidity, and allows compari-
son of the heat effects on health. For example, a 90 degree temperature could have a heat index
equivalent of 119 degrees, well beyond acceptable standards for personal health and environmen-
tal concerns.
64. Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
65. Id. at 577-78. See also Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Health Care, Political Choice, and the
Accidental Death Penalty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 2-5 (2008) (providing a similar account of
Mr. Souders' death).
66. See Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577-78.
67. Id. at 577, 579.
68. Transcript of Hearing at 265-66, Hadix 1, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (2006) (No. 4:92-CV-
110) [hereinafter 2006 Hearing].
69. Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 584.
70. Id.
71. 2006 Hearing, supra note 68 at 191-204; Pl.'s Ex. 106A at 1, Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d
574 (2006) (No. 4:92-CV-110).
258 [VOL. 18:251
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a death.72 After Mr. Souders served his disciplinary time, he was again
classified to general population but was returned to Top 6 for taking an
unauthorized shower on a hot day.73 The Top 6 cells lacked the standard
open grilled front of most prison cells. 7 4 Instead, prisoners were confined
in cells without a window or any ventilation.7 - When the solid metal door
was closed, the only way to communicate with the prisoner inside was
through the slot in the door that correctional officers used to insert food
trays.7 6 Top 6 was particularly oppressive on hot days because the cells were
essentially locked metal and cement boxes.7 7 A staff psychologist testified
that, on such days, when he opened the food slot of a prisoner on the unit
in order to counsel prisoners, he would feel a blast of hot air coming out of
the cell.7 8
Once in the segregation unit, Mr. Souders's behavior deteriorated.79
On August 2, 2006, he damaged a metal stool in his cell. 8 0 Staff responded
by putting him in standing restraints. 8' While he was in restraints, he tried
to flood his cell.8 2 This act resulted in a supervisory nurse giving approval
to turn off the water in his cell, although that order was later counter-
manded by custody because the entire prison was experiencing a heat alert
condition.8 3 At that point, staff responded by placing Mr. Souders on a
concrete slab, with metal restraints on his wrists and ankles.8 4 A mental
health worker who saw Mr. Souders that day characterized him as "flor-
idly psychotic," and by that time he was screaming incoherently. 5 Despite
Mr. Souders's apparent need for emergency intervention by mental health
staff, that intervention did not come.86 Moreover, presumably as a result of
Mr. Souders's mental deterioration, he rarely accepted water from staff87 at
a time when conditions in the unit were oppressively hot. The videotape
72. See, e.g., Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2001) (in a case involv-
ing the suicide of a prisoner confined in observation status on Top 6, affirming the denial of
qualified imnmunity to a prison psychologist).
73. Hadix 1, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577; 2006 Hearing, supra note 68, at 191-204.
74. The characterization of most prison cells is based on our experience.
75. See 2006 Hearing, supra note 68, at Pl.'s Ex. 106B (videotape on file with authors)
(showing Mr. Souders' cell).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at Pl.'s Ex. 103 at 73.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
82. Id.
83. 2006 Hearing, supra note 68, at Pl's Ex. 42 at 320844, 320904, 320906.
84. Hadix 1, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
85. Id. at 578.
86. Id.
87. 2006 Hearing, supra note 68 at 320844, 320904, 320906, 320952-62, 320964,
320966, 320969.
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unit recording events in Mr. Souders's cell shows that on August 2nd and
3rd, the first two days that he was restrained, custody staff were com-
plaining of the heat and humidity in his cell.8 8 At times, the video image is
obscured because the camera has fogged up.89
Mr. Souders repeatedly urinated on himself while in restraints and
eventually was left naked.9 0 His skin developed sores from lying in urine
without an opportunity to change his position.9 1 At one point, Mr.
Souders was taken out of his cell for a medical examination. 9 2 The physi-
cian declined to examine Mr. Souders, apparently because he had urinated
on the examining table.93 Despite all this, at no point did any staff member
demand that he receive an examination to determine his mental state. 94
On August 6th, Mr. Souders' fourth consecutive day of confinement in
four-point restraints, correctional officers took him to the unit showers.9 5
The videotape shows him staggering as he walked, unable to stand in the
shower, and requiring the use of a wheelchair to return to his cell.9 6 He
was moved to another cell in the unit, and shortly thereafter, the restraints
were removed.97 He fell to the floor and did not get up. Correctional
officers returned him to the concrete slab.98 A nurse then entered the
cell. 99 In response to a question from Mr. Souders, the nurse told him that
his pulse was faint, indicating that Mr. Souders needed emergency care. 00
Notwithstanding this finding, the nurse left Mr. Souders' cell without tak-
ing any steps to respond to the emergency, and Mr. Souders was discov-
ered to have died when staff reentered his cell about an hour later.o'0 The
subsequent autopsy listed the cause of death as hyperthermia with dehy-
dration as a contributing cause.10 2
The death of Mr. Souders is the most well-known tragedy resulting
from the MDOC's use of segregation as a housing location for seriously
mentally ill prisoners, but it stands out merely in the degree of harm in-
flicted. The only mental health beds in the Hadix complex currently are
88. See id. at Pls.' Ex. 42, 106B (videotapes on file with authors).
89. See id.
90. Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
91. Id. at 578.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 579.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also 2006 Hearing, supra note 68, at Pls.' Ex. 106B (on file with authors).
97. Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 579-80.
101. Id.
102. Stipulation to Supplement the Record of the October 11-13, 2006 Hearing, at Pls.'
Ex. A at 1, Hadix I, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (2006) (providing the Timothy Souders autopsy).
[VOL. 18:251260
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five observation cells. 0 3 At the time of the last hearing on mental health in
2008, when those observation cells were fill, staff was instructed to use the
Special Management Housing Unit (SMHU)-a disciplinary segregation
unit-instead.104 Mentally ill prisoners were frequently placed in the
SMHU. 0 5 As experts in the Hadix case have documented, prisoners suf-
fering from serious mental illness find it difficult to conform to the rules of
prison staff and the norms of prison culture.1 0 6 Thus, confinement of
mentally ill prisoners can start a downward spiral. In the stressful atmos-
phere of segregation, the mental status of many prisoners deteriorates, and
they become entangled in escalating conflict with staff. This deterioration
results in new disciplinary charges, including lengthening the stay in segre-
gation leading to further deterioration.' 0 7 Indeed, mental health staff at the
prison attempted to question the effects of placement of mentally ill pris-
oners in the SMHU, but the warden brushed off their concerns. 0 8
The problem of the assignment of mentally ill prisoners to the
SMHU is complicated by the fact that it has been common for prisoners
undergoing intake procedures at the Hadix facilities to have their mental
illness "undiagnosed." Psychiatrists were prone to consider inappropriate
behaviors as deliberate malingering rather than as symptoms of mental ill-
ness.109 The state psychologists complained in their staff meetings that the
psychiatrists were failing to identify prisoners who suffered from mental
illness or who were at risk of committing suicide. 1'0 Only 57 percent of
prisoners who reported that they had been taking psychotropic medica-
tions prior to coming to prison had those medications continued upon
arrival."' There was a several-fold difference between the rate of mental
103. Personal observation at Duane Waters Health Care during discovery inspection.
104. See Transcript of Hearing, April 25-30, June 11-12, 2008 at Defs.' Ex. BB, Hadix I,
461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 4:92-CV-110) [hereinafter 2008 Hearing] (discussing the function of
the SMHU).
105. See Fourth Report of the Office of the Independent Medical Monitor, April 24,
2008, at 5-8, Hadix 1, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 4:92-CV-110); 2008 Hearing, supra note 104,
at PIs.' Ex. 31 at 327001-327002.
106. Seegenerally, Terry A. Kupers, How to Create Madness in Prisons, in HUMAN PRISONS
(David Jones ed., 2006) (Dr. Kupers served as the psychiatric expert for the Hadix class).
107. 2008 Hearing, supra note 104, at 276-277, 317, 891-92.
108. Id. at Defs.' Ex. BB at 18.
109. For example, a psychiatrist at the MDOC's in-patient mental health facility diagnosed
a patient as bipolar with psychotic features. He was transferred to Duane Waters Hospital, given
anti-psychotic medications, and placed in mechanical restraints. He was neither eating nor
drinking, and was unresponsive. The psychiatrist who examined him there decided that the
patient was a "malingerer." As a result, the patient was force fed and almost died. Subsequently,
the MDOC was forced to begin guardianship proceedings. Fourth Report of the Office of the
Independent Medical Monitor, supra note 105, at 14-17.
110. 2008 Hearing, supra note 104, Pls.' Ex. 102 at 328378.
111. In 2007, 12.5 percent of newly-admitted prisoners arrived with a prescription for
psychotropic medications, but only 7.1 percent were admitted to the mental health treatment
caseload. Id. at Pls.' Ex. 45 at 37.
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illness diagnosed by one staff psychiatrist and others.112 As a result, less
than one-quarter of the prisoners eventually determined to need mental
health treatment while in prison were identified during the intake pro-
cess.1 1 3 Although MDOC policy limits the placement of severely mentally
ill prisoners in segregation, the policy cannot be effective when the seri-
ously mentally ill are not properly diagnosed.114
Finally, the harm from these failings of the MDOC continues un-
abated.' 15 Currently, policy severely limits the prescription on non-ge-
neric psychotropic medications for prisoners." 6 As a result, Hadix class
members who were receiving prescription psychotropic medications prior
to intake have these medications stopped or tapered and switched to older
medications."' 7 In one case we became aware of during an October in-
spection of the Hadix facilities, a prisoner undergoing intake had his
psychotropic medications abruptly discontinued." 8 In a matter of days, as
his psychological state deteriorated, staff placed him in an observation cell
but still did not provide the medication he needed." 9 Shortly thereafter,
his condition deteriorated profoundly to the point that he experienced
episodes of incontinence. 1 20 At that point, staff realized that he needed
effective medication and that he required in-patient mental health treat-
ment.121 Staff noted in his record the medication failures and the bad effect
of isolated confinement on his condition.122
112. During one six-month period, one psychiatrist approved fewer than half of incoming
prisoners screened by psychologists for admission to the mental health caseload. Id. at Defs.' Ex.
Z at 11. The other two full-time psychiatrists refused admission to the prisoners screened by the
psychologists at rates of 10.9 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively. Id. at 5-6. There were no
differences in the assignments of the psychiatrists that could have explained these discrepancies.
Id. at Tr. at 234.
113. Id. at Pls.' Ex. 45 at 39.
114. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY 04.06.182-MENTALLY DISABLED PRISONERS
IN SEGREGATION (2010).
115. See Change Notice No. 2 to Contract 07B9200147 between the State of Michigan
and Prison Health Service, Inc., at §1.031, T Q (requiring physicians providing service on behalf
of private medical contractor for prison system to refrain from prescribing non-generic medica-
tions for more than 15 percent of all prescriptions).
116. See infra text accompanying note 117 for a particularly unfortunate example of this
widespread practice.
117. Bureau of Health Care Servs., Confidential Medical Record, Mich. Dep't of Corr.
(Oct. 2012) (on file with authors).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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III. MICHIGAN POLICY RESULTS IN PLACING PRISONERS WITH
PHYSICAL HEALTH PROBLEMS IN SEGREGATION WHERE
THEY ARE AT HIGH RISK OF HARM
Michigan policy allows a prisoner to be assigned to segregated con-
finement because of his medical status. A number of prisoners who are
members of the Hadix class have been placed on segregated status because
of a diagnosis of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus,123 Commonly
known as MRSA, or drug-resistant "staph." A person who has been ex-
posed to the bacteria causing MRSA can spread it to others, even if the
carrier does not develop an infection.124 While most MRSA infections
involve the skin, under certain conditions such infections can become life-
threatening by spreading to the blood, lungs, or other organs.1 25 MRSA is
most common in facilities where large numbers of persons live together in
close quarters, such as hospitals and prisons. Under MDOC policy, the
determination of where to house a person with a MRSA infection is left
to the warden of the prison. 126 In our experience, this delegation of a
medical decision to the warden results in prisoners with MRSA being as-
signed to the regular segregation unit designated for prisoners who have
been found to have committed disciplinary violations in prison, or to a
holding cell located within a regular housing unit.127 In either case, the
prisoners are effectively in segregated confinement.128 When we inspected
the Hadix facilities prior to the mental health hearings in July 2008, we
talked to several prisoners who were being held in these holding cells be-
cause of a diagnosis of MRSA. In 2012, during a discovery inspection, we
reconfirmed that the SMHU cells in the Hadix facility are still used to
confine prisoners with contagious MRSA infections.129
In a case unconnected with the Hadix litigation, we are counsel for
Martinique Stoudemire, a former prisoner.' 3 0 Plaintiffs evidence in the
123. A related diagnosis that can land a prisoner in segregation in Michigan is vancomycin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus, also known as VRSA. See Vancomycin-Intermediate/Resistant
Staphyloccus (VISA / VRSA) in Healthcare Settings, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/organisms/visa-vrsa/visa-vrsa.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
124. Id.
125. MRSA, U.S. NAT'L LIBR. MEDICINE, http://www.ncbi.nhn.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/
PMH0004520 (last visited Apr. 4 , 2013).
126. See Deposition of George J. Pramstaller, D.O. at 47-48, Stoudemire v. Mich. Dept.
of Corr., No. 07-15387, 2011 WL 1303418 (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2011); Russell Memoran-
dum at 6022, Stoudemire, 2011 WL 1303418 (No. 07-15387).
127. See Pramstaller Dep., supra note 126, at 47-48; Russell Mem., supra note 126, at 6022.
128. See Pramstaller Dep., supra note 126, at 47-48; Russell Mem., supra note 126, at 6022.
129. Personal communication with Heidi Washington, Warden, MDOC Reception and
Guidance Center, at discovery inspection (Oct. 2012).
130. See Stoudemire, 2011 WL 1303418, at *1 (denying various defendants' motions for
dismissal or summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and specifically denying summary judgment to the warden regarding Ms.
Stoudemire's Eighth Amendment claims based on her placement in segregation). The defendants
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case indicates that Ms. Stoudemire was assigned to segregation solely be-
cause she was infected with MRSA, and she suffered immensely as a re-
sult.1 3 ' As a child, Ms. Stoudemire was diagnosed with systemic lupus
erythematosus,1 32 a chronic inflammatory disease of the immune system
that can affect many organs, including the heart, lungs, kidneys, and circu-
latory system.' 3 3 Prior to Ms. Stoudemire's incarceration, she experienced
kidney disease and circulatory problems that required leg surgery; however,
at the time that she entered prison in 2002 at the age of twenty-two, all of
her organs were functioning and all of her limbs were intact.134 Unfortu-
nately, after Ms. Stoudermire arrived in the Huron Valley Women's Facil-
ity, her health status declined markedly.' 3 5 By the end of 2005, she had
just undergone her second below-the-knee leg amputation.' 3 6 In January
2006, on the day that she returned from the hospital to the prison, labora-
tory tests indicated that she had acquired a MRSA infection in the stump
of her leg.'3 7
As a result of the MDOC policy mandating that the warden deter-
mine where MRSA quarantine should take place, Ms. Stoudemire was
moved from the prison infirmary to the segregation unit.'3 8 Unfortu-
nately, medical staff had little contact with the segregation unit.'3 9 The
prison physician did not see Ms. Stoudemire at any point during the two
weeks she was in segregated confinement.140 At the time Ms. Stoudemire
was assigned to segregation, she still needed daily dressing changes for her
actively-draining stump infection.141 She was weak, in great pain, and her
heart rate was significantly elevated at 120.142 She was also experiencing
severe psychological trauma from the loss of her remaining leg.14 3 MS.
in many instances dispute the evidence cited in this Essay, or the conclusions that we draw from
this evidence.
131. See R. 86, Ex. 31, Stoudemire Medical Records Excerpt 004420 (Jan. 18, 2005),
Stoudetnire, 2011 WL 1303418 (noting diagnosis of MRSA and movement to segregation) (on
file with authors).
132. Stoudenire, 2011 WL. 1303418 at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Stoudemire Decl. at 1 3, Stoudemire, 2011 WL 1303418 (No. 07-15387).
137. Exhibits to Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/
or Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Michigan Dep't of
Corr. Motion for Dismissal; R. 89-5, Declaration of Jerry S. Walden, M.D., Attach. 3, at 21,
Stoudenire, 2011 WL 1303418 (No. 07-15387) [hereinafter Walden Decl.].
138. Russell Memorandum, supra note 126, at 6025, Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136,
14.
139. Walden Decl., supra note 137, at 21.
140. R. 93, MDOC Medical Rec. at 004348, Stoudemire, 2011 WL 1303418.
141. Id. at 004419, 004387-88.
142. Id. at 004412.
143. Id. at 004412, 004378-79, 004417-18, 004357.
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Stoudemire was crying and undergoing abrupt withdrawal from narcotics
prescribed by the hospital to control the pain from the amputation.144
The segregation cell was unsanitary and unequipped for the special
needs of a person without legs.14 5 MS. Stoudemire found that the cell did
not allow her to transfer safely between the wheelchair, bed, and toilet, or
to use the shower facilities because the locked cell contained no grab bars
or bed trapeze for her use.14 6 Similarly, the toilet lacked a commode chair
to assist in transfer.147 MS. Stoudemire's inability to contact staff when she
needed help exacerbated these problems.148 MS. Stoudemire's cell was lo-
cated at a distance from the desk of the officer's desk, which was at the
other end of the segregation unit,149 and the cell lacked an emergency call
button.15 0 As a result, Ms. Stoudemire experienced great difficulties in
summoning staff when she needed their assistance. 15'
Two days after arriving in the segregation unit, Ms. Stoudemire had
to be sent to an outside hospital, where she stayed five days.152 When she
returned to the prison, she was again immediately sent to another segrega-
tion unit cell that lacked grab bars, a bed trapeze, or a commode chair.' 5 3
At this point, however, she had even more medical issues. The hospital had
installed an intravenous tube in her chest to facilitate delivery of the medi-
cations for the MRSA infection.154 Despite the unsanitary conditions in
her cell, the nurses required Ms. Stoudemire to change her own dress-
ings. 5 5 She defecated on herself when she could not get to the toilet on
time because of her physical limitations, and she was scolded by staff for
using a wastebasket when she did not have time to get to the toilet.' 5 6
The day after Ms. Stoudemire returned from the outside hospital, a
mental health worker at the prison spoke to her through the food slot in
her door.'5 7 Ms. Stoudemire reported that she had been crying and that
she felt like "giving up."' 5 8 She thought that staff wanted her to die.' 59
When Ms. Stoudemire reported to health care staff that she was experienc-
ing chest pain and shortness of breath, a nurse recorded "B.S." on a health-
144. Id.
145. Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136, 1 15, 19, 20-21.
146. Id. 1 25.
147. Id. 1 15.
148. Id. 1 20.
149. Id.
150. Id. 20, 25.
151. Id. 22.
152. MDOC Med. Rec., supra note 140, at 004415.
153. Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136.
154. MDOC Med. Rec., supra note 140, at 005901.
155. Id. at 004411.
156. Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136, 20.
157. MDOC Med. Rec., supra note 140, at 00565653.
158. Id.
159. Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136, 25.
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care form.o60 One day later, Ms. Stoudemire returned to the hospital
where the amputation had been performed for a follow-up appointment.
While there, she experienced breathing and heart problems that led to two
additional weeks of hospitalization.' 6'
IV. THE STAFF CULTURE OF SEGREGATION REMAINS UNCHANGED
Many different failures of policy and practice contributed to the
death of Timothy Souders and the ordeal of Martinique Stoudemire, as
should be apparent from even these brief accounts of their experiences. We
have asked ourselves, regarding both cases, how it could be that so many
staff observed the situations of these prisoners yet did nothing to stop their
suffering. We have also considered what changes would be necessary to
ensure that future MDOC prisoners with comparable physical or mental
disabilities avoid exposure to similar harm. First, and critically, these events
illustrate the dangers from the use of closed cells in segregation units, even
for short periods of time, to confine prisoners with severe medical or
mental health problems. As many mental health experts have repeatedly
explained, isolated cell confinement can be extraordinarily stressful, trig-
gering new mental illness or exacerbating existing illness, so that confine-
ment in segregation initiates a downward spiral in behavior that staff treat
as misconduct rather than symptoms of mental illness.162 As we and others
have observed,' 63 the standard physical features that mark cells in segrega-
tion units, such as the solid rather than barred doors, interfere with com-
munication with staff, and limit staff opportunities to detect deteriorating
mental or physical status.164 These features make it particularly likely that
prisoners with physical disabilities will suffer harm. Indeed, the leading
case in the Supreme Court regarding the applicability of the Americans
with Disability Act to prisons, United States v. Georgia,'6 5 involved a pris-
oner with paraplegia who alleged that he suffered injuries as a result of his
confinement in a segregation cell.' 66
We believe that both health care and custody staff assigned to segre-
gation units become accustomed to food slot communication and observa-
tion, and thus lose perspective on its dangers. In our experience, asking
that a cell door be unlocked and opened in a segregation unit, or that a
prisoner be escorted to an area that allows an appropriate examination,
160. MDOC Med. Rec., supra note 140, at 004318.
161. Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136, 1 23-24
162. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005).
163. See Hadix 1, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (concluding that the psychiatric needs of prisoners
in segregation were not being met in significant part due to prisoners' inability to request care
and ordering daily psychologist rounds as part of remedy).
164. Id. (providing that needs of mentally ill prisoners will often not be met in segregation
because of prisoner's inability to request care).
165. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
166. Id. at 154-55.
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tends to take significant time.1 6 7 Further, regardless of the reason that a
particular prisoner is confined in a segregation unit or in an observation
cell, the staff culture of segregation units emphasizes the unpredictability of
prisoner behavior. Prisoners in segregation are regarded as particularly
dangerous and not to be trusted. Thus, for example, when prisoners com-
plain of medical problems, both medical staff and custody staff are likely to
dismiss the complaints as merely attempts to obtain some illegitimate ad-
vantage from the system. The failure of the MDOC to develop or enforce
policies counteracting this culture produces the willful blindness to risk by
custody and medical staff that marked both the Souders and Stoudemnire
cases. As a result, staff ignore the risks of segregated confinement for pris-
oners with known medical and mental health problems. There is no sys-
tematic check to avoid obvious risks from placement in segregation for a
prisoner based on physical disabilities or other medical issues. For example,
the door to Ms. Stoudemire's segregation cells was only one-inch wider
than Ms. Stoudemire's hand-operated wheelchair. Attempting to leave the
cell was accordingly fraught with risk because of the possibility of injuries
to her hands, which were already compromised by her damaged circula-
tion. 168 Of course, a system that ignores the predictable consequences of
placing a woman with no legs in a cell with no disabilities accommoda-
tions is also likely to ignore this risk.
If a prisoner with mental health and medical problems similar to
those of Mr. Souders was charged with misconduct today, he or she could
still end up in segregated confinement. Under current policy, a prisoner
who is on the out-patient mental health services active caseload can be
placed in segregation if custody staff, after consultation with mental health
staff, determine that the prisoner's mental health needs can be met in seg-
regation.' 6 9 Similarly, the policy for release from segregation lists as one of
four factors for custody staff to consider whether the prisoner needs
mental health services, including in-patient treatment. 7 0 Custody staff,
however, are not required to release a prisoner who needs mental health
treatment that cannot be provided in segregation.' 7 ' Thus, MDOC policy
gives the final decision to custody rather than mental health staff. The dan-
gers that prisoners with untreated mental illness will be assigned to segre-
gation, and suffer harm as a result, have also been significantly increased
167. A few months ago, in a jail in another state, one of the authors asked that a door be
opened to a cell used to confine detainees on suicide observation to allow an inspection of
physical plant changes in the cell. There was a substantial delay because staff could not locate the
key.
168. Walden Decl., supra note 137, at 13.
169. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY 04.05.120-SEGREGATION STANDARDS 3
(2010) (on file with the authors).
170. Id. at 11-12.
171. Id.
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because the MDOC has implemented policies that have drastically reduced
the number of prisoners receiving psychotropic medications. 17 2
Nor has the potential for heat injury been effectively addressed. After
Mr. Souders' death, the MDOC closed JMF, the facility where he had
been housed in segregation. However, prisoners throughout the state who
are assigned to segregated statuses remain in cells that lack air-conditioning
and that are unsafe for prisoners at high risk of heat injury. Although pris-
oners in Hadix facilities at high risk of heat injury are eligible to move to a
large air-conditioned tent during periods of hot weather,' 7 3 the MDOC
has not implemented this policy in any other prison. 174
Further, despite the number of deaths in segregation related to dehy-
dration and exposure to excessive heat, current MDOC policy does not
require that health care staff be notified if a prisoner in segregation whose
access to water is restricted unless the prisoner is known not to have been
drinking for twenty-four hours.' 7 5 It is not obvious that custody staff
would even know whether the prisoner has been drinking water. Al-
though the policy requires documentation of when water was offered or
provided, the policy does not require that any staff member monitor
whether the prisoner actually drinks it.176
Today, a Michigan prisoner diagnosed with MRSA with disabilities
similar to those of Ms. Stoudemire could find herself subjected to similar
torture by placement in segregation. The policy directive governing segre-
gation provides that segregation cells may be used to house any prisoner
with a communicable disease who has been ordered to medical quaran-
tine.' 77 The policy directive regarding communicable diseases indicates
that the Regional Medical Officer or designee is to convey "recommenda-
172. A report of the Michigan Office of the Auditor General criticized the MDOC for
continuing the psychotropic medications of prisoners who arrived with prescriptions for such
medications. See MICH. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF PHARMA-
CEUTICAL COSTS, Finding 1 (2011), available at http://www.audgen.nichigan.gov/finalpdfs/10
11/r471032509L.pdf. The current contract of the MDOC with its health care provider Corizon
limits the percentage of prescriptions that can involve a non-formulary medication to 15 percent.
Contract No. 071B9200147 Between the State of Michigan and Corizon Health Inc. 26, availa-
ble at http://www.audgen.michigan.gov/finalpdfs/. In our experience, almost no prisoners who
arrive at the Reception and Guidance Center receive a non-generic psychotropic medication.
173. Stipulated Order to Terminate Prospective Relief Regarding Heat Abatement, Aug.
28, 2012, Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-cv-110 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (on file with author).
174. There is no statewide policy, only an Operating Procedure specific to the Hadix facili-
ties. See Attach. to Memo. in Support of Joint Motion for Approval of Parties' Stipulation to
Terminate Prospective Relief Re. Heat Abatement & for Setting Scheduling Conference at 2,
Hadix, No. 4:92-cv-110. Any statewide policy would bear the same numbers and be listed
among the publicly available policy directives online. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY Di-
RECTIVE 03.04.100-HEALTH SERVICES.
175. MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 169, at 7-8. Notification is required after twelve
hours if the facility is on heat alert at the time. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 3.
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tions" regarding the control of an outbreak of a communicable disease,
including recommendations to isolate the prisoner, "to the Regional
Health Administrator (RHA), [the MDOC Bureau of Health Care Ad-
ministrator], and, as appropriate, the [w]arden." 7 1 It does not indicate
who must make the ultimate decision to utilize segregation for a prisoner
with a communicable disease like MRSA.17 9 Additionally, the policy di-
rective regarding medical orders and accommodations for disabilities,
which is cross-referenced in the segregation Policy Directive, gives to the
Director of the MDOC the ultimate authority to deprive a prisoner as-
signed to segregation of accommodations, such as a wheelchair or hearing
aid ordered by medical staff as a result of a prisoner's disability or medical
need.o80 Until the MDOC provides safe housing for prisoners with the
entire range of medical needs that require special accommodations, such
prisoners remain at risk of suffering a disastrous outcome as punishment
for the offense of illness or disability.
V. THE SAME BARRIERS THAT THREATEN ACCESS To HEALTH
CARE FOR MICHIGAN PRISONERS IN SEGREGATED CONFINEMENT
ALSO IMPAIR ACCESS TO THE COURTS
We have argued that prisoners who suffer from mental or physical
illness are particularly at risk when placed in isolated confinement, among
other reasons, because of the barriers to communications and to responses
to emergency needs that such confinement creates. Aside from all the in-
herent barriers that are likely to impede a mentally ill prisoner or physi-
cally-disabled prisoner from pursuing a civil rights claim related to isolated
confinement,'" such a prisoner will face extraordinary barriers from the
legal system. While a detailed exposition of these barriers is beyond the
178. MICH. DEP'T OF COR. . POLICY 03.04.110-CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE Dis-
EASES 1-2 (2010).
179. See id.; see also MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 169, at 6-7.
180. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY 04.06.160-MEDICAL DETAILS AND SPECIAL
ACCOMMODATIONS 2 (2008) (providing that if the warden and a medical practitioner disagree
on whether to remove an accommodation such as a wheelchair from a prisoner, the disagree-
ment shall be resolved by referral to "the chain of command"). In the MDOC chain of com-
mand, the Chief Medical Officer of the Bureau of Health Care reports to the Director of the
MDOC. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 169, at 4.
181. The vast majority of prisoners who attempt to pursue litigation regarding their condi-
tions of confinement must do so without a lawyer and must generally do so through preparing
her own pleadings or gaining the assistance of another prisoner. Prisoners with severe disabilities,
even if not held in segregation, will be held in a specialized unit where they lack opportunities to
interact with more than a few other prisoners. A prisoner with significant limitations in mobility
is likely to face particular impairments such as problems in assembling the necessary information
for a filing and transportation problems because of the difficulties that disabled prisoners face in
being transported. Ms. Stoudemire, for example, dreaded medical appointments outside the
prison because many of the transportation vans were not appropriately equipped and staff were
sometimes unhelpful. On one occasion, she had to crawl into the van because staff would not
assist her. See Stoudemire Decl., supra note 136, f 2-11.
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scope of this Essay, we will sketch out some of the obvious issues. For
example, if a prisoner files a civil rights claim while still in prison, he or
she will be required to demonstrate compliance with the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). The Act requires that prisoners, unlike most civil
rights plaintiffs, demonstrate that they have exhausted available administra-
tive remedies before filing suit. 18 2 Yet as a practical matter, neither
Timothy Souders nor Martinique Stoudemire would have had a reasonable
opportunity to initiate their requests for administrative remedies within the
seven days that the MDOC grievance system mandates.' 8 3 The videotape
of Mr. Souders strongly suggests that he was neither mentally nor physi-
cally capable of obtaining the proper form and writing or filing a grievance
in the days before his death.184 Ironically, the only reason that a civil rights
action was available in his case was that the event was fatal; the restrictions
of the PLRA did not apply to his case because the plaintiff was technically
his estate, and the Act applies only to "prisoner" plaintiffs. 185
Ms. Stoudemire was also incapable of exhausting her civil rights
claims after her ordeal in the segregation unit, followed by two weeks at
University of Michigan hospitals. Indeed, if Ms. Stoudemire had thought
of exhausting her civil rights claims at all, she could have reasonably as-
sumed that, because she had not filed grievances while she was locked in
the segregation cell and could not get attention for her urgent needs, any
grievance that she could have filed would have been rejected by the
MDOC as untimely. Ms. Stoudemire could have similarly anticipated that,
unless she had attempted informal resolution of her grievance with staff
within two days, and thereafter had filed a formal grievance within five
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (providing that no "action shall be brought with respect
to prison'conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.").
183. See MICH. DEPT oF CORR., POLICY 03.02.130-PRISONER/PAROLEE GRIEVANCES
P (2007).
184. 2006 Hearing, supra note 68, at Pls.' Ex. 106A at 1, (log describing Mr. Souders' last
few days, in restraints and incoherent; on Aug. 3, 2006 he was "yelling and making strange
screaming sounds" (10:10); "talking incoherently and rolling his head from side to side" (11:30);
screaming unintelligible ramblings (14:05); "sitting up, yelling" (14:48, 14:56, 15:01)). The case
law is split regarding whether a prisoner's mental condition can make the prison grievance sys-
tem "unavailable" to that particular prisoner. Compare Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 867 (5th
Cir. 2003) (indicating that a personal inability to utilize a grievance system could mean that the
grievance system was unavailable and therefore a prisoner was not required to exhaust it prior to
filing a claim subject to PLRA) with Ferrington v. La. Dep't of Corr., 315 F.3d 529, 532 (5th
Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoner plaintifPs severe visual impairments did not relieve prisoner of
the obligation of exhaustion of grievance system before filing case subject to PLRA).
185. Wrongful death cases filed by an estate are not brought by a prisoner confined in any
prison, and therefore, they are not subject to the PLRA. See, e.g, Simmons ex rel. Estate of
Simmons v. Johnson, No. 7:05-CV-00053, 2005 WL 2671537, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2005);
Netters v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 04-2396 MA/P, 2005 WL 2113587, at *3 n.3 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 30, 2005); Greer ex rel. Estate of James v. Tran, No. Civ.A. 02-3145, 2003 WL
21467558, at *2 (E.D. La. June 23, 2003).
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days, the grievance would have been rejected as untimely under MDOC
policy.18 6 Ms. Stoudemire was ultimately able to file a civil rights lawsuit
in federal court only because she was eventually released from prison so
that PLRA no longer applied to block her litigation.1 8 7 Unfortunately, the
necessary consequence of waiting until after release was that Ms.
Stoudemire had to forego challenges to her treatment by staff during the
earlier part of her incarceration, which precluded challenges to the care she
received related to the events that led to her first leg amputation.1 8 8
The substantive law of the Eighth Amendment can also have particu-
larly pernicious effects in the context of solitary confinement. In order to
prove an Eighth Amendment violation related to prison conditions of con-
finement, prisoners must meet a difficult test: they must demonstrate that a
defendant had actual knowledge of a substantial risk to prisoner health or
safety but disregarded that risk.189 The features of segregation that interfere
with prisoners' ability to communicate their needs, as well as staff observa-
tion of those needs, thus have the potential of preventing prisoners from
demonstrating a constitutional violation in precisely the circumstances in
which high-risk prisoners are most vulnerable to harm.
The facts from a recent case decided by the Supreme Court illustrate
the predictable nature of these emergencies, even among prisoners not ob-
viously at risk of a crisis related to placement in isolation. In Ortiz v. Jor-
dan, the Supreme Court decided a procedural question regarding the
necessity after a jury verdict of renewing a motion forjudgment as a matter
of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 190
The case involved a prisoner in Ohio who had filed a civil rights claim
charging that, after she reported that a staff member had sexually assaulted
her, other staff members violated the Eighth Amendment by allowing her
to be sexually assaulted again, as well as subsequently by transferring her to
isolation.' 9 1 The staffs announced reason for transferring her to isolation
was to prevent her from continuing to discuss the assaults with other pris-
oners, conversations which were alleged to interfere with the ongoing in-
186. See MICH. DEP'T OF CoRR&., supra note 183, T P.
187. See, e.g., Norton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2005); Nerness
v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir.
2002).
188. While Ms. Stoudemire's complaint included a discussion of the first amputation,
when defendants argued that events relating to that amputation were barred by the statute of
limitations, she responded by disavowing any intent to seek recovery for the actions of defendants
related to events more than three years before filing. Rather, she argued, the allegations about
earlier events were relevant as background and for various evidentiary purposes, such as defend-
ants' knowledge of the risk to her. The district court accepted this construction of the com-
plaint. Amended Order at 12, Stoudemire v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., No. 07-15387, 2011 WL
1303418 (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2011).
189. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
190. 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011).
191. Id. at 890.
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vestigation.192 After a few days in isolation, the plaintiff, who had been
strong enough to pursue a claim of sexual assault despite substantial obsta-
cles, was described as ill and vomiting. A psychologist recommended that
she be moved to the prison infirmary, where she stayed a week.' 93
Ms. Ortiz's ordeal suggests that, when a prisoner is experiencing a
crisis-a common circumstance when a prisoner is sent to segregation-
the additional stress of segregated confinement is particularly likely to give
rise to urgent health needs. Further, because the point of segregating pris-
oners is to reduce their ability to interact and communicate with others,
proving a constitutional violation becomes more difficult precisely because
of that isolation. There is not much one can observe through a solid door,
and very little more that can be observed through an occasional view
through a food slot. Thus, the requirement that a particular defendant be
shown to have actual knowledge of a "substantial risk of serious harm"' 9 4
often poses an insurmountable legal obstacle to the plaintiff when the
events at issue in the litigation took place in physical surroundings that
were designed to cut the prisoner off from others. The combination of the
physical barriers of segregation with the cultural barriers to staff perception
of risk that are endemic to segregation are deadly-too often to the pris-
oner, but also, routinely to the prisoner's legal claim.
VI. CAN WE IMAGINE AN APPROACH THAT MIGHT WORK?
We believe that it is helpful to focus attention on the potential risk of
harm to all prisoners posed by the isolation and loss of ability to obtain
assistance from staff in emergencies that flows from segregation confine-
ment. Indeed, given the current energy in the movement challenging seg-
regated confinement, there is perhaps a chance that prison officials may pay
more attention to these risks. If so, staff training materials and policies
could begin to reflect more recognition of the generic risks in segregation,
as well as special risks of prisoners with particular physical or mental
vulnerabilities.
For prisoners with medical and mental health problems, the risks of
placement in segregated housing, with its resulting restrictions on their
ability to community with staff and staffs ability to monitor their needs
may well be best analyzed according to the admonition in Farmer v. Bren-
nan that, "[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single
source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner
faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all
192. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 F. App'x 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 884
(2011).
193. Id. The plaintiffs only obvious high risks of mental or physical harm from confine-
ment in isolation were the recent trauma of sexual assault and a history of domestic violence
incidents. See id.
194. See Farner, 511 U.S. at 837.
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prisoners in his situation face such a risk."' 9 5 Although official MDOC
policy now restricts the assignment of seriously mentally ill prisoners to
segregation,19 6 actual practice, as the case of Timothy Souders demon-
strates, has been considerably less enlightened, and formal MDOC policy
needs more clarity.' 7 In contrast, some other prisons have been forced by
court orders, or have agreed following litigation, to adopt more effective
screening policies. 19 8 In addition, the MDOC already recognizes that it
must screen prisoners with physical disabilities to avoid assignment to facil-
ities that lack appropriate accommodations.' 9 9 However, the MDOC's
policies regarding accommodations for physical disabilities are deeply
flawed on their face, because they allow other institutional needs such se-
curity to trump a prisoner's needs for accommodations for disabilities. 200
These same flaws played a central role in the ordeal of Martinique
Stoudemire.
As an interim step to reduce the risks from segregated confinement,
the MDOC needs to promulgate and implement policy imposing a rigor-
ous exclusion from segregation of the seriously mentally ill and those
whose medical needs cannot be met in segregation. A more effective solu-
tion would be to eliminate the confinement of prisoners in segregation.
Most effectively, the solution is to eliminate such confinement and mas-
195. Id. at 843.
196. See MIcH. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 114.
197. See supra text accompanying note 60.
198. See. e.g., Disability Law Ctr. v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., C.A. No. 07-10463-MLW,
2012 WL 1237760 at *5, *9 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012) (approving settlement agreement prohibit-
ing the placement of seriously mentally ill prisoners in segregation; collecting cases recently
ordering similar relief or approving it in settlement agreements); Jones'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp.
2d 1096, 1116-25 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975, 984-86 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (finding that confining mentally ill prisoners in the conditions existing in administrative
segregation violated the Eighth Amendment); D. M. v. Terhune, 67 F. Supp. 2d 401, 403,
410-11 (D.N.J. 1999) (approving settlement with safeguards to prevent disciplinary segregation
confinement of prisoners suffering from serious mental illness); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp.
1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that prisoners at particularly high risk of suffering serious
injury to their mental health could not be confined in segregated special housing units); cf
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011) ("Prisoners in California with serious mental
illness do not receive minimal, adequate care . . . . Other inmates awaiting care may be held for
months in administrative segregation, where they endure harsh and isolated conditions and re-
ceive only limited mental health care").
199. MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY 4.06.160-MEDICAL DETAILS AND SPECIAL Ac-
COMMODATIONS NOTICES 2-3 (2008) (on file with the authors).
200. See id. at 2 (providing that if a warden disagrees with a decision by a medical provider
to order a medical accommodation for a prisoner, the disagreement is to be "referred through
the appropriate chain of command until it is resolved"). Medical staff within the MDOC ulti-
mately report to the Director of the MDOC. See MICH. DEPT' OF CORR., POLICY 01.01.101-
DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2012) (providing that the Chief Medi-
cal Officer of the MDOC reports to the Director of the Department for medical policy pur-
poses) (on file with the authors).
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sively reduce the nation's massive over-incarceration rate that has led us
into the disastrous reliance on this dangerous and discredited practice.
